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Security Council

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Letter dated 10 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey to you the concerns of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda regarding the continued illegal supply of arms and ammunition to militia groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In this regard, I would like to refer you to the crash last week at Kamina of a cargo aircraft, which delivered arms and ammunition to both Congolese and foreign armed groups, including the ex-FAR/Interahamwe militia responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in the Minembwe region of South Kivu in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was seized of the matter, Congolese authorities prevented it from carrying out an investigation.

It has come to our attention that a colonel of the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), together with two officers of the genocidal ex-FAR forces, were among those on board this aircraft.

The Government of Rwanda has on several occasions complained about the continued supply of weapons and ammunition to the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The supply of arms, ammunition and other assistance to these genocidal militias is not only a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 1291 (2000), 1304 (2000), 1316 (2000), 1332 (2000), 1335 (2001), 1341 (2001), 1417 (2002), 1445 (2002) and 1493 (2003), but it is also a contravention of the letter and spirit of the Principles of Good-Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, agreed in New York in September. It should also be noted that these acts violate the Lusaka and Pretoria Agreements.

This confirmed delivery of weapons and ammunition to ex-FAR and Interahamwe at a time when the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is labouring hard to put an end to the Third Party Verification Mechanism of the Pretoria Agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is cause for concern for the Government, because these mechanisms were meant to monitor the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of the forces.

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It is also regrettable that this delivery of weapons occurred less than one month after the good will mission of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda to Kinshasa.

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda also regrets that MONUC was prevented by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from carrying out immediate inspection and verification at Kamina. It is an outrage that a United Nations observer mission, with a Chapter VII mandate, can be so wantonly frustrated and prevented from executing its mandated responsibilities.

While drawing the attention of the Security Council to the continued threat that the delivery of weapons and ammunition to the Rwandan genocidal forces represents for our country and the region, the Government of the Republic of Rwanda wishes to reiterate its unwavering determination and commitment to work for peace, stability and development in the Great Lakes region. We appeal once more to the Security Council to take the necessary steps to ensure that these genocidal forces are completely neutralized.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Stanislas **Kamanzi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



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Letter dated 10 November 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

As you will recall, I dispatched a multidisciplinary assessment mission to the Central African subregion from 8 to 22 June 2003, pursuant to a request of the Security Council, contained in its presidential statement of 31 October 2002 (S/PRST/2002/31), to explore ways to implement a comprehensive, integrated and resolute approach to the issues of peace, security and development in Central Africa. The mission visited all 11 States members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and submitted its report to me on 10 September 2003.

I am pleased to bring to the attention of the Security Council the findings of the mission. I am in general agreement with the assessment made by the mission. I also believe that there is a need for greater coordination and coherence in the activities of the different components of the United Nations system. While the assessment of the peace and security aspects adequately covers all the key issues, there is a need to undertake further examination of the root causes of the conflicts that have plagued some of the countries in the subregion. I have, therefore, requested that a thorough review of the programmes of the United Nations be carried out, with a view to enhancing their coherence and effectiveness. I intend to keep the Council informed of developments in this respect.

The United Nations will continue to be involved in the search for long-term peace and stability in the subregion, providing the necessary support to the States members of ECCAS. During meetings with the mission, most of the Governments in the subregion expressed their desire for an enhanced United Nations presence, including through the establishment of a United Nations office. I am however concerned about the proliferation of offices, bearing in mind that there are already a number of United Nations structures in the subregion, including three offices headed by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

There are also numerous initiatives that encompass a large number of the 11 ECCAS member States, some of which are also part of other subregional groupings. As the Council is aware, many of the countries concerned will be involved in the International Conference for the Great Lakes region, which is expected to result in a regional framework to enhance stability, security, cooperation and development. Under these circumstances, and without first carrying out the review mentioned above, it would not be possible to make an objective assessment of the need for establishing a new office in Central Africa.

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I am proposing, however, to appoint a Special Envoy who would be available — as required — to work on political issues with Governments in the subregion, and who would also interface with the United Nations entities involved in development and humanitarian activities in Central Africa. One of the key priorities will be to identify concrete measures to support the capacity of ECCAS and other mechanisms that the countries in the subregion have established. I shall ensure that the Special Envoy works in full consultation and collaboration with my Special Representatives in the subregion so as to avoid duplication of effort.

With the concurrence of the Council, I intend to proceed with the approach that I have outlined as early as possible. I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its attachment to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

Interim report of the multidisciplinary assessment mission to the Central African subregion

Summary

A United Nations multidisciplinary assessment mission visited Central Africa from 8 to 22 June 2003 to undertake a review of the priority needs and challenges confronting the subregion, focusing especially on issues of peace, security, economic development, humanitarian affairs, human rights and HIV/AIDS, and to define the appropriate subregional strategies to address those challenges. The assessment was conducted in partnership with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the principal subregional institution responsible for peace and security in Central Africa. The Secretary-General authorized the mission pursuant to the request of the Security Council in its presidential statement of 31 October 2002 (S/PRST/2002/31), to explore ways in which the United Nations could support Central African States in developing a comprehensive and integrated subregional approach to the issues of peace, security and development in Central Africa.

The mission, headed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh, visited all of the 11 States members of ECCAS. It sought to define the strategies that could be employed to strengthen the effectiveness of subregional institutions in the area of peace and security. The mission held extensive consultations with Governments, political and civil society leaders, business leaders and representatives of trade unions, subregional institutions, members of the diplomatic community, and United Nations agencies and programmes.

The mission concluded the visit to the subregion with a strong sense of a striking paradox, namely, that Central Africa is potentially one of the richest subregions in Africa but also contains the largest number of States that fall among the lowest in almost all human development indices. Central Africa is also mired in armed conflicts, many of them recurrent and persistent over many years, countless crises of governance, proliferation of small arms, the fragility of the security sectors, cross-border movement of weapons, drugs and armed groups, mass movements of refugees, underdevelopment of infrastructure, widespread poverty and weak State institutions, all of which have had a debilitating effect on the subregion's overall socio-economic and political performance.

The mission concluded that, as a result of the cross-cutting and other challenges that transcend national boundaries, an integrated and holistic subregional approach is required to complement national solutions and lay a durable foundation for the solutions.

Despite the many problems that are highlighted in the present report, the mission also concluded that the prospects for positive change remain high, especially if the international community maintains and intensifies its partnership with subregional organizations, Governments and civil society groups to address the problems confronting Central Africa.

All the countries visited, except one, specifically called for the setting-up of a political presence of the United Nations in the subregion, through the establishment of an office in Central Africa. Such an office would, they argued, facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive and integrated approach to the issues of peace, security and development in the subregion.

I. Introduction

1. At the open meeting of the Security Council held on 22 October 2002 on strengthening cooperation between the United Nations system and the Central African region in the maintenance of peace and security, which was attended by several Foreign Ministers from the subregion, Council members called for international support for regional initiatives to consolidate recent progress towards peace in the area. On 31 October 2002, in continuation of its discussion on the item, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2002/31) in which it affirmed the need to promote and strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and the Central African States in the field of peace and security. The Council called on the Central African States, with the support of the United Nations, to improve the effectiveness, coordination and cohesion of organizations in the subregion. The Council also emphasized the importance of a comprehensive, integrated, resolute and concerted approach to the issues of peace, security and development in Central Africa and, in that connection, invited the Secretary-General to report to the Council within six months on ways to implement such an approach for Central Africa, including through the dispatch to the region of an inter-agency evaluation mission.

2. On 17 April 2003, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh, on behalf of the Secretary-General, briefed Council members on the various efforts undertaken by the United Nations to promote durable peace in Central Africa. He informed the Council of the Secretary-General's intention to dispatch a multidisciplinary assessment mission to Central Africa to explore ways and means to implement a comprehensive and integrated approach to the issues of peace, security and development in the subregion.

3. In a statement to the press following that meeting, Security Council members re-emphasized the importance of a comprehensive, integrated, resolute and concerted approach to the issues of peace, security and development in Central Africa and welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to dispatch a multidisciplinary assessment mission to the subregion. They furthermore invited him to submit to the Security Council at the end of that mission a report with recommendations on measures to be taken for the implementation of such a global approach. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Council's request.

II. Establishment and activities of the mission

4. The multidisciplinary assessment mission visited the Central African subregion from 8 to 22 June 2003. Headed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs the mission comprised representatives of the following departments, offices, agencies and programmes of the United Nations system: Department of Political Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). As the role of the United Nations in this endeavour is essentially to support the efforts of regional States and institutions, the mission was carried out in close partnership with the main subregional institution responsible for issues of peace, security and subregional

integration in Central Africa, namely the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The Deputy Secretary-General of ECCAS and a senior military officer therefore also participated in the mission.

5. The mission's terms of reference were the following:

(a) To identify priority needs and challenges in Central Africa in the areas of peace, security, economic and social development, humanitarian affairs and human rights, including the inter-linkages between those needs and challenges;

(b) To consult with Governments and subregional institutions in Central Africa on ways and means of enhancing cooperation with the United Nations in addressing those needs and challenges;

(c) To identify subregional measures to be implemented by the Economic Community of Central African States[1] and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC),[2] with the cooperation of the United Nations, to help to address the needs and challenges identified;

(d) To make recommendations on how best the international community can support specific programmes designed to strengthen the effectiveness of subregional efforts and institutions in the area of peace and security.

6. The mission visited all 11 States members of ECCAS, namely, Gabon, headquarters of ECCAS (8, 10 and 22 June), Sao Tome and Principe (9 June), the Republic of the Congo, current chair of ECCAS and CEMAC (10 and 11 June), Angola (12 and 13 June), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (13-15 June), Burundi (15 and 16 June), Rwanda (16 and 17 June), Cameroon (17 and 18 June), Equatorial Guinea (19 June), Chad (19 and 20 June) and the Central African Republic, CEMAC headquarters (21 and 22 June).

7. The mission met with heads of State or Government, other senior government officials, leaders of main political parties, representatives of civil society and non-governmental organizations, business and religious leaders and members of the diplomatic community. The mission also held working sessions with the United Nations country teams in all the countries visited. In Libreville, Kinshasa, Bujumbura and Bangui, the mission was briefed, respectively, by the military components of CEMAC, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the African Union, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic as well as CEMAC officers in Bangui. In addition, the mission held discussions with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, and with the Secretary-General and other senior secretariat officials of ECCAS.

8. The various interlocutors welcomed the mission as an important reaffirmation of the United Nations commitment to remain engaged in the subregion and to assist them in dealing with the numerous problems confronting Central Africa. Among the issues discussed were the economic and political relations among and within ECCAS member States, peace and security concerns, peace-building and peacekeeping efforts in the subregion, conflict situations in the Central African

[1] The following 11 countries are members of ECCAS: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.

[2] The following six countries are members of CEMAC: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

Republic and the Great Lakes region, in particular the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, disarmament, reintegration and repatriation of former combatants, cross-border incursions, illegal arms trafficking, illegal exploitation of national resources, proliferation of arms and cross-border movements of bandits and militias, landmines, the need to promote national reconciliation and political dialogue, governance, human rights and humanitarian issues, the weaknesses of subregional institutions and the need to strengthen their capacities and to enhance cooperation with the United Nations, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, poverty reduction and other economic and development issues, the need for capacity-building and regional integration, and issues affecting children, including child trafficking, prostitution, teenage pregnancies, the problems of street children and child soldiers.

9. Most interlocutors called on the United Nations to be more proactive in the prevention and management of conflicts in the subregion. Pointing to the weaknesses of their subregional institutions, regional leaders specifically requested the assistance of the United Nations in strengthening the operational capacities of those organizations. Many also underlined the need for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and subregional organizations, especially in the implementation of a comprehensive and integrated subregional approach to dealing with the issues of peace, security and development in Central Africa. To that end, all the countries visited, except one, called for the setting-up of a political presence of the United Nations in the subregion, through the establishment of an office in Central Africa. Such an office would, they argued, facilitate the implementation of the proposed approach.

III. Background

10. The Central African subregion, which comprises the 11 ECCAS member States, has a combined population of approximately 115 million and covers a land area estimated at about 6.6 million square kilometres. A particularly striking paradox in Central Africa is the fact that it is potentially one of the richest subregions in Africa, greatly endowed with a wide variety of natural resources (for instance eight ECCAS countries[3] are either current or future oil producers) but, at the same time, it is the subregion containing the largest number of countries that rank lowest in almost all of the human development indices. The subregion is also characterized by the recurrence of armed rebellions and conflicts that have hampered its development efforts over decades. In 7 of the 11 countries visited, over 50 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line. Seven of the countries — Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda — are either in conflict or in post-conflict situations. Only Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe have been unaffected by direct conflict and appear to be enjoying relative stability.

11. Many critical cross-cutting challenges, including ethnic tensions, refugee movements, armed rebellions, cross-border incursions, non-inclusive governance, fragile national dialogue and reconciliation processes, nationality concerns, widespread poverty and deprivation are common to the subregion and would need to be addressed if sustainable peace and progress are to advance in the countries concerned. As a result of those critical problems, subregional integration, vital for

[3] Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe.

long-term stability and development, has been slow in coming. The fact that some ECCAS member States belong to other subregional organizations, such as CEMAC, the Southern African Development Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, has also not facilitated regional integration in Central Africa.

12. Sustained efforts have been made at various levels to help Central Africa to stabilize the situation and lay the foundations for durable peace and stability. To that end, the six States members of CEMAC, the members of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States,[4] and the African Union and the United Nations have been particularly active. In addition, Central African States have benefited through bilateral efforts with countries and institutions outside the region to enhance their capacities to manage crisis situations and participate in peacekeeping operations.

13. United Nations support has included the development and enhancement of capabilities for early warning and conflict prevention, and the deployment of peace-building offices and peacekeeping operations. Currently, United Nations peace-building offices are deployed in two countries in Central Africa, Burundi and the Central African Republic, while a peacekeeping operation (MONUC) is deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, based in Nairobi, and the dispatch of several special envoys to the subregion further contribute to United Nations peace endeavours in Central Africa.

14. United Nations contributions have also included the establishment, in May 1992, of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, with the objective of promoting arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building measures among members of ECCAS. Since its establishment, the Committee has provided the main forum under which ECCAS member States meet on a regular basis to discuss and exchange information on peace and security challenges in the subregion.

15. Despite these various efforts, Central Africa continues to encounter enormous pressures in the political, economic, social and security areas, which have perpetuated politico-military crises in the countries directly affected and beyond, especially as many of the crises and their consequences frequently affect or otherwise threaten to spill over into neighbouring countries.

IV. Priority needs and challenges

A. Peace and security

16. The continuing fragility of democratic political processes in the subregion was demonstrated most recently by the coup d'état in the Central African Republic in March 2003 and the attempted coup in Sao Tome and Principe in July 2003. In his report of 13 April 1998 on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa (A/52/871-S/1998/318), the Secretary-General observed that the causes of conflict in Africa vary, reflecting the diversity and complexity of the continent. They include historical legacies, internal and external factors and economic motives. The root causes of the current situation in the Central African subregion can, in particular, be traced to at least two main

[4] Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia.

internal sources, namely, the crisis of governance and the widespread poverty, which have, in several cases, been compounded by external factors. Thus, despite the enormous natural wealth of the subregion, mismanagement and unconstitutional, non-inclusive rule have not only retarded its development but also polarized its societies, leading in extreme cases to recurrent armed rebellions and prolonged wars. The dire consequences of the conflicts have seriously undermined Central Africa's efforts to ensure sustainable peace and development.

17. In most of the countries visited by the multidisciplinary assessment mission, particular concern was expressed about the impact of extreme and widespread poverty and especially high levels of unemployment among young people, who could easily be pushed into banditry or armed mercenary activities. Women's groups, in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, voiced strong criticism of what they said was a common practice of unequal treatment and the exclusion of women from political decision-making processes and the management of public affairs. As women have been the most affected by conflicts in the subregion, they called for more balanced representation and participation in conflict prevention and peace processes as well as in political decision-making.

18. Insecurity in many post-conflict countries in the subregion is often fuelled by armed rebellions, banditry, the proliferation of small arms, and the inability of the security forces to maintain law and order. Frequently, security forces in many countries of the subregion are selected on an ethnic basis and are therefore unable to engender broad confidence or provide effective security to all sectors of society.

19. The proliferation of small arms is both a cause and consequence of the subregion's recurrent conflicts. According to UNDP, in the Great Lakes region alone there are more than 1 million illegal small arms in circulation. In the Congo, there were approximately 40,000 illegal weapons in circulation in 2001.

20. Unless addressed successfully, the issue of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, especially in post-conflict situations, could jeopardize the consolidation of peace and stability in the countries concerned. Large numbers of former fighters, if they do not receive proper assistance to resume constructive civilian life, could be forced to resume destabilizing activities, either as mercenaries or as members of militia groups, thus increasing the threat of trans-border violence and urban criminality.

21. Several disarmament programmes have been designed by Central African countries but not yet implemented, owing to the lack of resources. These include the programme of priority activities relating to the illegal trade in small arms adopted by the ECCAS Foreign Ministers at the nineteenth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, held at Brazzaville in May 2003. Progress has, however, been made under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in the Great Lakes region, a four-year initiative (2002-2006) coordinated by the World Bank and regrouping 30 donor countries and United Nations partners and designed to promote the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of about 350,000 ex-combatants in nine countries. ECCAS is involved in the implementation of that programme, which covers six of its members, namely Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.

22. The mission noted that, given the proximity and porosity of the borders linking the countries in Central Africa, as well as the long-standing and complex interrelationships among the countries and peoples of the area, unsettled crises and

conflicts in any State of the subregion frequently impact on or spill over into its neighbours. Government officials in Cameroon and Gabon in particular expressed concern at what they characterized as a "risk of contamination". The regional impact of the conflict situations in the Central African Republic and the Great Lakes region were repeatedly mentioned as telling examples.

23. Furthermore, the cross-border circulation of weapons and the movement of armed groups, bandits and refugees in Central Africa vividly illustrate this linkage, the repercussions of which have affected the prospects for peace, security and development throughout the subregion. This was the conclusion drawn by Amara Essy, whom the Secretary-General had dispatched as his Special Envoy to the Central African Republic and the Congo in December 2000 to assess the impact of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on those two neighbouring States. The Special Envoy found that the subregional humanitarian, economic and security consequences of that conflict were devastating, and were likely to linger so long as the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo persisted.

24. Subsequently, in his report of 21 September 2001 on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2001/886), the Secretary-General indicated that the problem of security in that country needed to be addressed in a broader context of the pursuit of the restoration of peace and stability to the subregion as a whole.

25. The impact of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the nine countries bordering it was also highlighted during the visit of the mission. Many interlocutors strongly believed that the restoration of lasting stability to that country was a condition sine qua non for sustainable stability for its neighbours and for the subregion as a whole. In this regard, government officials in Cameroon, Chad, the Congo and Gabon deplored the fact that they were not included in the consultations concerning the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, even though they suffered from the direct impact of the conflict in that country. Consequently, they requested that their countries be included as full participants in the proposed international conference on the Great Lakes region. A number of subregional leaders also stressed the urgent need for the Security Council to provide MONUC with a robust enforcement mandate to enable it to assist effectively in restoring peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

26. Despite the many challenges that remain, the mission noted that prospects for the subregion, albeit still fragile, had shown signs of great improvement. In Angola, for example, peace has been steadily taking root since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding at Luena, Angola on 4 April 2002 by the Government of Angola and UNITA. The transformation of UNITA from an armed movement into a political party has contributed positively to the peace process. In Burundi, despite the fact that the overall security and political situation remains volatile, there are positive developments in the implementation of the transitional arrangements provided for under the Arusha Agreement. While the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi is not yet complete, essentially for lack of funding, the setting-up of assembly points for the cantonment of the armed opposition's combatants is ongoing. The issues of security, land, property claims and restitution are some of the unresolved challenges that continue to face the country. In Sao Tome and Principe, regional peace efforts have successfully returned the constitutional order to power following the attempted coup d'état of 17 July 2003.

27. In the Central African Republic, there was widespread lawlessness, looting and destruction of property in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the government of the former President, Ange Félix Patassé, in March 2003. The

situation has improved markedly since the deployment of 300 French troops, however, as well as 500 Chadian soldiers to support the CEMAC force, which includes troops from Gabon and the Congo. Furthermore, the efforts of the regime to promote dialogue and reconciliation appear to have greatly reduced political tension. The Central African Republic is currently actively engaged in transitional arrangements aimed at restoring democratic and constitutional government by 2005.

28. Security in Chad continues to improve despite recurrent tensions in parts of the country and the continuing circulation of arms within the civilian population. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the installation of the transitional government and agreement on the integration of combatants from the armed opposition into the national armed forces has improved prospects for sustainable peace. Security remains an issue of the utmost concern, however, especially in the Ituri district and other areas in the eastern part of the country.

29. Efforts are continuing to consolidate the important gains made as a result of agreements reached by the Government of the Congo and armed militia groups to enhance prospects for broad-based national reconciliation and peace. Relief agencies operating in the country continue to express concern, however, at the acute humanitarian challenges in the Pool region, where the destruction of infrastructure, poor sanitary conditions, inadequate health services and malnutrition, especially of children, could discourage the full return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes. It is also considered that greater political overture, especially to opposition members still in exile, could strengthen the process of national reconciliation and help reduce recurrent rebel activities.

30. In Rwanda, the Government continues to work on reconciliation efforts, putting in place confidence-building measures such as the recent release from custody of 40,000 persons facing various allegations connected to the genocide of 1994, the initiation of the *Gacaca* justice process (a traditional justice system similar to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission), the conducting of a referendum on a new constitution in May 2003, and the organization of multiparty presidential elections in August 2003.

B. Challenges of poverty

31. The protracted crises in the region have had a considerable negative effect on the living conditions of the people of Central Africa and have increased poverty in the subregion. Governments of countries in conflict or post-conflict situations have had to divert meagre resources to meet increased security requirements. As a result, investments in vital social sectors such as education, health and housing have suffered, and infrastructure has deteriorated.

32. Today, poverty is pervasive in the subregion and more than half of the population lives below the poverty line. Although many countries have prepared commendable poverty reduction strategy papers, it would be unrealistic to expect poverty challenges to be addressed effectively without peace and stability.

33. It is worth noting that several political leaders and other stakeholders who met with the mission stressed that, without trust and confidence among the leaders in the subregion, economic integration, necessary for sustainable growth, which in turn was vital for poverty reduction, could not be achieved.

34. Private sector representatives were of the view that the fight against corruption and impunity should be addressed more effectively and that new regulatory

frameworks more conducive to private investment should be promoted. In so doing, governments in the subregion would not only help to combat poverty but also prevent future conflicts since improved economic opportunities could generate greater employment, especially for young people who might otherwise drift towards destructive activities such as banditry or participation in armed militia groups.

35. Africa's heavy debt burden was evoked as one of the key factors hindering investment in social sectors. For many countries in the region, the proportion of debt to gross national income was said to have reached an unbearable point: 137.9 per cent in Angola, 221.4 per cent in the Congo, 309.5 per cent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 548.1 per cent in Sao Tome and Principe.

C. Humanitarian issues

36. The mission was informed that the number of displaced persons in the subregion (internally displaced, asylum seekers and refugees) had reached approximately 3 million.[5] It was also stressed that, while many of the States in the subregion have generously hosted refugees from neighbouring countries, large population movements can be politically, socially and environmentally destabilizing. The high costs of such cross-border movements, including the rapid spread of the HIV/AIDS virus and other infectious diseases, represent additional pressures for those developing countries already overburdened by many other challenges.

37. In Angola, the armed conflict that was the major cause of forced internal and external displacements of people is over, but daunting humanitarian challenges remain. The steady return of relative security in the country has increased the potential for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding of 4 April 2002, between the Government of Angola and UNITA has paved the way for peace and national reconciliation. In July 2003, the Government of Angola, UNHCR and asylum countries launched a programme for the voluntary repatriation of 450,000 Angolan refugees from southern Africa. At the same time, the Government of Angola has undertaken to reintegrate approximately 400,000 former UNITA combatants and their dependants. The repatriation and reintegration programme is impeded by logistical and safety constraints, such as damaged infrastructure, limited availability of public services, and the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

38. In Burundi, insecurity constitutes the main impediment to the implementation of humanitarian relief operations, especially in the southern and eastern regions of the country. The United Nations and the African Union are cooperating to support the return of Burundian refugees in safety and dignity.

39. Widespread lawlessness and the looting of property, including property belonging to humanitarian relief agencies, followed the coup that overthrew the

[5] The precise figure is 2,997,434 (Angola: 202,000 internally displaced persons and 12,830 refugees/persons of concern; Burundi: 100,000 internally displaced persons and 54,210 refugees/persons of concern; Cameroon: 52,597 refugees/persons of concern; Central African Republic: 50,204 refugees/persons of concern; Chad: 17,000 refugees/persons of concern; Congo: 111,670 refugees/persons of concern; Democratic Republic of the Congo: an estimate of 2 million internally displaced persons and 331,241 refugees/persons of concern; Gabon: 18,952 refugees/persons of concern; Rwanda: 46,730 refugees/persons of concern; figures for Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea were not available). The figure is derived from UNHCR reports.

democratic government in the Central African Republic in March 2003. That event affected the provision of protection not only to refugees but also to foreign nationals, particularly Chadian nationals living in the Central African Republic. That provoked a large influx of displaced persons into Chad, including both Central African refugees and Chadian nationals who had fled instability in the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, the stabilization of the political situation in Chad offers the potential for the return of approximately 30,000 Chadian refugees who have been living in northern Cameroon for more than a decade. UNHCR is currently engaged in assisting Central African refugees located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo to return home voluntarily.

40. As a result of the encouraging political dispensation evolving in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, humanitarian conditions are said to have begun to improve. However, owing to the persistent insecurity in the eastern part of the country, particularly in the Ituri district, relief agencies continue to experience limited access to internally displaced persons and displaced refugee populations.

41. The consolidation of peace in the Congo could pave the way for the voluntary repatriation of refugees, especially from neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Gabon. UNHCR is also assisting in efforts to repatriate refugees from other subregional States, including Angola and Rwanda, who have been living for many years in the Congo.

42. As a result of the improving conditions for return in Rwanda, UNHCR has, since October 2002, been actively promoting voluntary repatriation to Rwanda. UNHCR plans to repatriate approximately 60,000 Rwandan refugees during the course of 2003-2004. Indeed, approximately 23,000 Rwandan refugees were repatriated from the United Republic of Tanzania during the last quarter of 2002 and, in the first half of 2003, more than 6,000 Rwandan refugees have been assisted to return home.

D. Human rights issues

43. The prevalence of civil wars, rebellions and banditry in the subregion has heightened threats to individual and community rights, especially as the conflicts have eroded the capacity of governments to provide effective security, guarantee respect for human rights and safeguard the rule of law.

44. Furthermore, the subregion is characterized by rapidly increasing urbanization without development or adequate social services. The population is therefore exposed to grave pandemics with no access or only very limited access to adequate health care, limited access to educational systems and inadequate development of local governing structures. Not only is the development process hampered, but the fundamental principles of a rights-based approach to development are not applied, including the right to participation by all and the inclusion of vulnerable groups.

45. Despite, or perhaps as a result of, having abundant natural resources, the subregion is plagued by problems related to conflicts over natural resources. This situation fuels xenophobia, discrimination against migrant workers and human rights violations relating to the exploitation of natural resources. The exploitation of the subregion's natural resources has not significantly advanced human development and social solidarity in the countries concerned. Major transnational companies operating in those countries have not always demonstrated sufficient social and

environmental sensitivity, leaving the conditions of the people and of the local communities unimproved.

46. Some encouraging signs can be found in the untapped potential of women in the countries of the subregion, the resilience and even the expansion of civil society in many countries and the enactment of groundbreaking legislation such as the "oil law" in Chad, which commits the Government to using its oil revenues for poverty reduction. The law stipulates that 10 per cent of royalties and dividends will be set aside for future generations, 80 per cent will be devoted to health, education, social services, rural development and public infrastructure, while 5 per cent will be invested back in the oil-producing region. It should be noted that within the framework of the law an oversight committee including representatives of civil society, Parliament, the Supreme Court and the Government has been created. This law, representing a kind of self-binding initiative, is almost unique.

E. HIV/AIDS

47. Central Africa is severely affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the majority of countries in the subregion being confronted with a prevalence rate of over 5 per cent among the sexually active population. In 2001, the prevalence rate ranged from 5.5 per cent in Angola to 14.8 per cent in the Central African Republic. The rate increased from 0.5 per cent in 1987 to 11.8 per cent in 2000 in Cameroon and from 1 per cent in 1986 to 7.7 per cent in 2001 in Gabon.



Source: Country reports, 2002.

48. The number of people affected by HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is estimated at more than 4 million of the area's total population of around 640 million inhabitants. The pandemic is increasingly striking young people.

49. The infection rate is even more serious among the security forces and urban dwellers in the subregion, ranging from 8 per cent to 20 per cent among security personnel and from 20 per cent to 50 per cent among prostitutes in the major cities. The full extent of the pandemic is still not known in areas ravaged by armed conflicts.

50. The high mortality rate associated with AIDS deprives families of their loved ones and support, and further impoverishes those who are already poor. This negative impact is also responsible for absenteeism and the reduction in productivity observed in the workplace, resulting in declines in savings, increased social expenditures and dwindling investment capacities. The combined effect of the pandemic has resulted in drastically curtailed development efforts in ECCAS countries.

51. Moreover, hospital structures are overburdened with the care and treatment of patients. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, patients suffering from AIDS-related diseases occupy 50 per cent of hospital beds. In all the countries concerned, families and communities lack the necessary resources to care and cater for those infected.

52. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, in the 1980s about 319,000 people are estimated to have died of AIDS in ECCAS countries, which have also seen a sharp drop in life expectancy. In Angola and Cameroon, for example, it is estimated that life expectancy has been reduced by about 5 years and 10 years, respectively, largely because of HIV/AIDS.

53. Early mortality caused by HIV/AIDS has produced more than 2 million AIDS orphans in Central Africa, nearly half of them (930,000) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 210,000 in Cameroon. In Rwanda, the 240,000 AIDS orphans have added to the thousands of other children orphaned by the conflicts that have ravaged the country during the past decade.

54. As everywhere else in Africa, countries in Central Africa started to put in place, as early as 1987-1988, national HIV/AIDS control programmes, with the support of the World Health Organization. As from 1996, with the support of UNAIDS, African countries started to develop strategic plans which facilitated the intensification of partnerships between the different actors involved in AIDS control. Despite those efforts, however, the epidemic is still spreading, owing to inadequate responses related to a poor level of national coordination and timid political commitment, late implementation of a multisectoral and decentralized response with greater involvement of the civil society, and extensive delays in the application of sound strategies of access to voluntary testing and treatment. It is to be noted that Central African countries are still not benefiting fully from opportunities to mobilize additional resources: for instance, only 4 of the 11 ECCAS countries are benefiting from the World Bank's AIDS assistance programmes, while only 3 countries have so far gained access to resources from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. It is also noted that the implementation of the Abuja Declaration of April 2001, in which African leaders pledged to devote 15 per cent of their national budgets to health and AIDS control, is not yet fully effective.

F. Subregional institutions

55. ECCAS, which has its headquarters in Libreville, was established in 1983, initially with the goals of promoting economic development and integration and fostering a common market among member States. Recognizing that economic progress could not be achieved in a climate of conflict and crisis, the goals were later expanded to include efforts to promote peace and security. The mission noted that the mechanisms set up by ECCAS to promote economic integration and sustainable peace and security in the subregion had not yet become fully operational. They include the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, the Early-Warning Mechanism for Central Africa and the Central African Multinational Force. In addition, the fact that CEMAC is increasingly active in the areas of peace and security, as shown by its deployment of a regional peace force in the Central African Republic, a task which essentially falls outside its mandate, is further evidence of the vacuum that exists as a result of the inability of ECCAS to discharge fully its responsibilities in this field. Following the mission's visit to the subregion, the protocol on the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa came into force after its recent ratification by two additional member States, bringing the total number of full parties to 8 of the 11 member States.

G. United Nations presence in the subregion

56. The United Nations currently operates two mechanisms that deal with issues relating to peace and security in the Central African subregion. One of these is the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, based in Yaoundé, which was established in June 2002, at the request of the Governments of the subregion, to help to build national capacities in the areas of human rights and democracy by providing support to Governments, national institutions and non-governmental organizations. The second mechanism is the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, established in 1992 to promote arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building measures among States members of ECCAS. Since its creation, the Committee has served as the main forum at which ECCAS member States meet on a regular basis to discuss the challenges relating to peace and security in their subregion. The Department for Disarmament Affairs currently serves as the secretariat of the Committee. Several United Nations programmes and agencies, such as the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), have established subregional offices to deal with cross-cutting issues and implement regional projects.

H. Regional integration

57. Despite its great potential, the process of subregional integration has made only modest progress so far in Central Africa. The fact that Central African countries belong to different economic and political subregional entities, that they lack viable communication infrastructure, and that they have not fully implemented agreements on the free circulation of people and goods, has not facilitated integration. Most of the mission's interlocutors stressed the importance of such integration and called for the implementation of "integrating projects" to promote transnational economic infrastructure, telecommunications, transport, water and energy. Progress is gradually being made in the area of the free movement of

peoples, the leaders of CEMAC having decided to establish a CEMAC passport for their citizens. It should be noted that the ECA subregional development centres for Central and Eastern Africa, based respectively in Yaoundé and Kigali, have both developed integrating projects on water, energy, transport and communications.

V. Observations

58. The attempted coup d'état in July 2003 in relatively stable Sao Tome and Principe, barely a month after the mission's visit, demonstrates vividly the continuing volatility of the Central African subregion. The quick restoration of constitutional rule in that country, through the joint efforts of regional leaders and leaders of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, is a testimony to the potential role of regional organizations and to the growing determination of African leaders to promote democratic governance and the rule of law. At the same time, that event demonstrates that, while the restoration and consolidation of lasting peace in Central Africa remains the primary responsibility of the Governments and peoples of the subregion, the international community should continue to be supportive, for peace to be sustainable.

59. Issues of peace and security lie at the core of the challenges that confront the subregion. While United Nations offices and missions in Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are focused on country specific problems of peace consolidation and peacekeeping, there is an urgent need for the United Nations to help to implement subregional policies to support efforts to address cross-cutting challenges, including the promotion of good governance, and to stem the illegal flow of arms, drugs and militia.

60. As a result of the close linkage between poverty and conflict, it is essential for the United Nations and its agencies to develop a holistic and integrated approach to the problems of Central Africa in order to address conflicts at their core and to enhance the ability of the national, subregional and international actors to be more proactive in identifying and preventing future threats.

61. Subregional approaches are also required for effective security sector reform to mitigate the illegal flow of arms and armed elements from one country to another in the subregion. United Nations agencies operating in Central Africa should continue to enhance their efforts in support of the country-specific disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in the subregion, especially in countries that are not covered by the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.

62. Cross-border challenges, such as population movements, drugs and small arms trafficking, as well as the transnational movements of mercenaries and militias should be addressed more vigorously and proactively, with the support of the United Nations. Joint programmes in border areas, such as health, education and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, would be one way of combating such phenomena. Those issues should also be integrated into a more systematic planning of "exit strategies" for United Nations peace operations. To that end, for instance, the United Nations should report more frequently and systematically on the patterns of arms flows into the region, and especially on the activities of producer countries and arms merchants.

63. The liberalization of cross-border trade, especially in agricultural products, would help to improve market access and promote relationships between the local populations living in border areas.

64. A United Nations system-wide integrated approach in partnership with other humanitarian and development actors should be implemented to deal with the interrelated challenges of repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction in the Central African subregion.

65. Poor governance practices, such as the lack of accountability and transparency, impunity, exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, absence of the rule of law and respect for human rights have often triggered or exacerbated conflicts. Policies to promote respect for human rights, the rule of law and the development of inclusive and responsive governance would facilitate the establishment and consolidation of peace and stability in the subregion.

66. There is a need to strengthen institutional capacities of governance at the national, subregional and regional levels to enhance conflict prevention through the promotion of good governance practices. In this regard, the capacity of civil society to play a key role in democratization and peace-building should be strengthened.

67. It would also be important to strengthen the justice systems in the countries of the subregion to ensure predictability and reliability in the discharge of justice; these are essential attributes of good democratic practices and good governance and for the promotion of human rights.

68. In setting human rights policies, the following elements should be taken into account:

- National human rights protection systems should be strengthened by enhancing national institutional capacity. A subregional judicial training centre could be established as a concrete contribution to this goal. Allowing lawyers from the subregion and beyond to assist anyone requiring help before national judiciaries is also important and may be facilitated by the United Nations system.
- Human rights education, the promotion of a culture of peace and tolerance and reconciliation should be facilitated and promoted in the subregion.
- To fight against impunity and promote reconciliation, a mechanism should be established to address the fate of victims of numerous conflicts in the countries of the subregion, including by providing compensation and rehabilitation. Special attention should be paid to women and children.

69. The HIV/AIDS pandemic poses a serious and potentially explosive threat to the subregion, including for subregional peace, security and development. Efforts to promote greater awareness of this danger and to prevent and fight HIV/AIDS should be intensified and coordinated at the subregional level, especially given the porosity of borders and the increasing cross-border movements of people. The United Nations should cooperate with ECCAS to ensure effective subregional leadership and coordination of such efforts.

70. Central African subregional institutions, including ECCAS, CEMAC and the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, should integrate the problem of HIV/AIDS into the agenda of peace, security, and political, economic and social issues that they deal with. The Organisation de coordination pour la lutte contre les endémies en Afrique centrale should ensure the coordination of the subregional

monitoring of health issues, in order to establish a regional HIV/AIDS strategy and to develop a United Nations assistance programme; to intensify the integration of HIV/AIDS issues into the concept of operations of the peacekeeping missions in Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; to integrate HIV/AIDS into the demobilization, disarmament, reintegration and rehabilitation programmes in Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; to enhance the presence of UNAIDS in Central Africa and to address HIV/AIDS at the International Conference on the Great Lakes region.

71. I wish to express my deep gratitude to the Governments of the subregion, the secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States, the United Nations country teams and members of civil society, including the business community and trade union organizations, for the effective support and cooperation they extended to the multidisciplinary mission in each of the countries visited.

Annex

List of participants

The mission was led by the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Tuliameni Kalomoh.

Department of Political Affairs

Margaret Vogt, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General

Angèle N. Makombo-Eboum, Political Affairs Officer

Jean-Francis Joh Epoko, Political Affairs Officer

Suzanne Biloa, Personal Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Gérard Gerold, Senior Political Affairs Officer, MONUC

Department for Disarmament Affairs

Ivor Fung, Director, Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Lomé

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Pierre Gelas, Regional Disaster Response Adviser, Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Bacre Ndiaye, Director, New York Office

Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

Innocent Gabriel Dassanou, Security Coordinator in Cameroon

United Nations Development Programme

Babacar Cissé, Senior Country Programme Adviser (Central and Eastern Africa)

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Wairimu Karago, Regional Coordinator for operations in the Great Lakes region

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

Pierre M'Pele, Team Leader for West and Central Africa

United Nations Human Settlements Programme

Joseph Guiebo, Senior Human Settlements Officer, Regional Office for Africa and Arab States

United Nations S/2003/1078

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 November 2003

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus

(for the period from 21 May to 10 November 2003)

I. Introduction

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 21 May to 10 November 2003 and brings up to date the record of activities carried out by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1486 (2003) of 11 June 2003, as well as my mission of good offices carried out pursuant to Security Council resolution 1250 (1999) of 29 June 1999.

2. During this period, my Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, was assigned new responsibilities as my Special Representative for Western Sahara. Zbigniew Wlosowicz continued as my acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission, and Lieutenant General Jin Ha Hwang continued as Force Commander. As at 7 November, the strength of UNFICYP stood at 1,230 military personnel and 42 civilian police officers (see annex).

II. Activities of the Force

A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and military status quo

3. The military situation along the ceasefire lines was generally calm. However, there has been an increase in the number of moves forward by Turkish forces into the buffer zone. There have also been more incidents of verbal abuse, threats, stone-throwing and cocking and pointing of weapons by both National Guard and Turkish forces.

4. The number of air violations increased from 9 during the last reporting period to 49: 19 by Turkish military aircraft, 8 by the National Guard, 6 by Greek Cypriot civilian aircraft, 6 by Cypriot police helicopters and 10 of unknown origin.

5. Restrictions imposed on UNFICYP in July 2000 by the Turkish forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces continued to obstruct the operations and daily routine of UNFICYP, despite the limited easing of these restrictions in May 2003 (see

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S/2003/572, para. 5). The violation of the military status quo in Strovilia persisted. The Turkish Cypriots have undertaken further construction on the Greek Cypriot house that they use as a control post in the village.

6. In July and August, UNFICYP observed an increase in the activity of Turkish forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces in the fenced-in area of Varosha, mainly maintenance of patrol tracks and cleaning of the area. At the same time, the Turkish forces delayed the routine maintenance tasks of UNFICYP and continued to restrict its patrols to a northern sector of the fence line, static observation posts and a short patrol route inside Varosha. The United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in Varosha.

7. Crossings of the maritime security line — the seaward extension of the median line of the buffer zone, which vessels of either side are advised not to cross — continued. In the west, the number of crossings by Turkish forces resupplying the Kokkina pocket was higher than in the last reporting period. In the east, Greek Cypriot fishing boats and pleasure craft were responsible for an increased number of crossings.

8. Following the ratification of the Ottawa Convention on landmines and the expression of the National Guard's intention to clear the minefields it had laid in the buffer zone (see S/2002/1243, para. 7, and S/2003/572, para. 8), a technical adviser on demining joined UNFICYP in October to advise the mission on the clearing of minefields in the buffer zone. The National Guard has provided the technical adviser with relevant information to enable him to prepare the next steps. In July 2003, the Turkish Cypriot side indicated its willingness to discuss with UNFICYP the issue of demining in Nicosia and its environs. These discussions have begun.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

9. As at 2 November, 2 million crossings, by Greek Cypriots to the north and Turkish Cypriots to the south, had taken place at the Ledra, Ayios Dometios/Metehan, Pergamos and Strovilia crossing points since they opened on 23 April. UNFICYP civilian police continued to assist in ensuring the safe and orderly crossing of people and vehicles through the buffer zone at the authorized crossing points. Incidents at the checkpoints and in the north and south necessitated civilian police monitoring and intervention. The arrival of additional officers helped to reinforce the civilian police presence on the ground and to improve the response time in cases of incidents requiring their assistance. During the reporting period, the UNFICYP civilian police and the civil affairs branch attended to and monitored 165 cases, including unauthorized crossings, thefts, traffic violations and accidents, unauthorized photography and charges of disrupting public order. The two sides brought criminal charges in 14 cases involving Greek Cypriots in the north and 48 cases involving Turkish Cypriots and other residents in the south. The UNFICYP civilian police visited Turkish Cypriots in detention in the south and Greek Cypriots detained in the north.

10. UNFICYP provided facilities for 128 bicommunal events at the former Ledra Palace Hotel in the United Nations buffer zone, bringing together 11,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots. About 3,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots attended the annual United Nations Day celebrations. UNFICYP also assisted in facilitating other events within the United Nations Protected Area, including seminars for teachers, meetings

for the disabled, music rehearsals, a theatre play, a light and sound presentation on the history of Nicosia, a study on the buffer zone survey, a workshop on the Nicosia Master Plan and various sporting events at the Nicosia airport.

11. UNFICYP continued to carry out its mandated humanitarian tasks in support of the 423 Greek Cypriots and 152 Maronites living in the northern part of the island. A request for adding a seventh grade at the Greek Cypriot school in Rizokarpaso was turned down by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Consequently, 15 of the 23 pupils who had completed primary school had to move to the south to pursue their education. UNFICYP assisted 120 Turkish Cypriots in the south to obtain identity documents, housing, welfare services, medical care, employment and education through its liaison office in Limassol.

12. UNFICYP continued to support civilian activities in the buffer zone. In particular, it facilitated a range of agricultural activities, including the maintenance of farming tracks and the cleaning of irrigation channels.

III. Committee on Missing Persons

13. During the period under review, the First Assistant to the Third Member continued to work with the two sides, as acting Third Member, to overcome obstacles and to enable the Committee on Missing Persons to resume its activities. The Greek Cypriot side proceeded with its programme of exhumation and identification.

IV. Mission of good offices of the Secretary-General

14. In my report to the Security Council on the good offices efforts between late 1999 and 11 March 2003 (S/2003/398), I outlined my views on the way ahead and what is required for any resumption of active United Nations efforts to achieve a solution to the Cyprus problem. It remains my position that no purpose would be served by renewing my mission of good offices unless there were a readiness on the part of both Cypriot parties, as well as Greece and Turkey, to finalize negotiations, with United Nations assistance, on the basis of the revised proposal that I presented to the parties and the guarantor Powers on 26 February 2003, and to put the resulting agreement to separate, simultaneous referendums within a short time thereafter. In its resolution 1475 (2003) of 14 April 2003, the Security Council gave its full support to this plan as a unique basis for further negotiations and called upon all concerned to negotiate within the framework of my good offices, using the plan to reach a comprehensive settlement as outlined in my report. I regret to say that the requirements set out in the report have not yet been fulfilled. However, I am continuing to monitor developments in Cyprus closely, and I wish to assure the Council that, should the appropriate opportunity to finalize the plan present itself, I stand ready to re-engage.

V. Financial aspects

15. By its resolution 57/332 of 18 June 2003, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of $43.8 million for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from

1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. This amount includes the voluntary contribution of one third of the cost of the Force, equivalent to $14.6 million, from the Government of Cyprus and the voluntary contribution of $6.5 million from the Government of Greece.

16. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months, the resources available for maintaining the Force would be limited to the amount approved by the General Assembly. Additional resource requirements arising from the increase of the UNFICYP civilian police component authorized by the Council in its resolution 1486 (2003) would be reported to the Assembly in the context of the UNFICYP budget performance report for the 2003/04 financial period.

17. As at 30 September 2003, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNFICYP for the period from 16 June 1993 to 15 December 2003 amounted to $19.9 million. As at the same date, total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping missions amounted to $1,559.5 million.

VI. Observations

18. The situation along the ceasefire lines has remained stable. The partial lifting of restrictions on movement between the north and the south has resulted in a steady number of Cypriots regularly crossing the buffer zone with a remarkable low number of incidents. Regrettably, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have failed to provide unhindered access and full freedom of movement to UNFICYP. I urge them to do so to allow UNFICYP to carry out its mandate throughout its entire area of responsibility. It is also regrettable that no progress has been achieved in restoring the status quo ante in the village of Strovilia.

19. I believe, nonetheless, that only the achievement of a comprehensive settlement will bring an end to the Cyprus problem. In the absence of such a comprehensive settlement, the presence of UNFICYP on the island continues to be necessary for the maintenance of the ceasefire. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 15 June 2004.

20. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. de Soto, Mr. Wlosowicz, Lieutenant General Hwang and the men and women serving in UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they have discharged the responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Annex

Countries providing military and civilian police personnel

(as at 10 November 2003)

Country	*Military personnel*
Argentina[a]	403
Austria	7
Canada	1
Finland	3
Hungary	120
Ireland	6
Slovakia	276
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	414
Total	**1 230**

Country	*Civilian police*
Australia	15
Ireland	20
Nepal	5
Netherlands	2
Total	**42**

[a] The Argentine contingent includes soldiers from Bolivia (2), Brazil (2), Chile (32), Paraguay (32), Peru (2) and Uruguay (3).



Map No. 2930 Rev. 54 UNITED NATIONS
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Security Council

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12 November 2003

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Letter dated 11 November 2003 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to forward herewith a letter addressed to you by Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, concerning the construction of the Israeli expansionist wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, along with an urgent plea from the residents of Qalqilya (see annex and enclosure).

I would appreciate your drawing the attention of the members of the Security Council to the present letter and its annex, and circulating them as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yahya **Mahmassani**
Ambassador

03-61015 (E) 131103 141103

Annex to the letter dated 11 November 2003 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Cairo, 5 November 2003

I am writing to you with regard to the increasing and alarming practices of oppression that are continuously being imposed by the Israeli occupying forces upon civilians within the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Such practices have reached an unprecedented level of aggression with the construction of the racist expansionist Israeli wall causing enormous damage to the Palestinian Territories and community. In response to these belligerent acts, the General Assembly of the United Nations has recently adopted a resolution by high majority, which condemned the construction of the wall and demanded that Israel stop and reverse its construction, reiterating its opposition to the de facto annexation of Palestinian lands.

In this regard, I would like to draw your attention to an urgent and moving plea that I have received from the Palestinian residents of the city of Qalqilya, in which they describe the atrocious developments that are taking place in their devastated city as a consequence of the construction of the Israeli separation wall. Qalqilya, as they describe it, has become the largest prison in the world, its 42,000 inhabitants blocked and besieged on all four sides, with only a single eight-metre entrance controlled by the Israeli occupation forces.

While enclosing herewith a copy of this imploring plea that reflects the gloomy image of this city, I hope you will consider adopting a firm and practical position that would help relieve the residents of Qalqilya, as well as other Palestinian cities, from this siege that is being imposed by Israel.

Israel's persistence in proceeding with the construction of this wall seriously threatens to turn the whole of the Palestinian territories into one enormous jail and would destroy any remaining hope for ending the Israeli occupation that began in 1967, and the establishment of a viable Palestinian State in accordance with the Quartet's Road Map and the vision of two States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side within secure and recognized borders.

(*Signed*) Amre **Moussa**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

To: H.E. Mr. Amre Moussa, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

Almighty God has said: "And say, 'Act ye;' and God and his Apostle and the believers shall see your acts."

Sir,

We are following your kind words on satellite television and your patriotic standpoints on Arab causes in general and the Palestinian cause in particular and have the honour to send you the present urgent request and appeal for assistance from the people of the disaster-stricken city of Qalqilya with its 42,000 inhabitants which has become the largest prison in the world, having been surrounded by the Israelis with an apartheid separation wall, wire fencing and ditches on all four sides, apart from a single entrance 8 metres wide, controlled by the Israelis and opened and closed at their whim.

Israel's objective in building this apartheid wall, specifically at the city of Qalqilya which is regarded as the soft underbelly of Israel, is to drive its inhabitants away, and steal their land and water. But we tell you, Mr. Secretary-General, that, God willing, we shall resolutely remain on our land despite all difficulties. However, we address to you and to the Arab and Islamic nation this entreaty and appeal, asking you to do what you can to save this long-suffering and beleaguered city and to help its people to remain on their land and in their own homeland. May God bless you for doing so.

(Signed at Qalqilya on behalf of the Municipality)

United Nations S/2003/1080

Security Council

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12 November 2003

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Letter dated 11 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you my letter addressed to the members of the Security Council.

I would be grateful if you could circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Revaz **Adamia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

03-61028 (E) 131103

Annex to the letter dated 11 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Before I proceed, I would like to thank, through you, the Secretary-General, the Secretariat and, in particular, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mrs. Heidi Tagliavini, and the staff of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for their tireless efforts to move the peace process in Abkhazia, Georgia, ahead, even when the task seems to be extremely difficult.

I would also like to express our thanks for the quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the peace process, which clearly delineates both progress and lack of it in the last three months. It is in that spirit that I write to you today. It is incumbent on all of us to look upon the peace process in its entirety, to point out what we have achieved and what still needs to be done.

On the positive side of events, my Government wholeheartedly welcomes what we have come to know as the Geneva process. The three main directions elaborated during the last two meetings at Geneva bear major significance and could potentially bring us closer to real progress. However, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia stated in his address during the general debate, it must remain a priority that the process be result-oriented and not merely a process. The creation of the task forces, as foreseen in the first Geneva document, have not been carried through. It is our belief that it is the right time to move ahead on this issue.

On numerous occasions, we have noted the significance of the Sochi meeting between the Presidents of Georgia and the Russian Federation. The agreements reached there are of utmost value and potential. The working groups created under the Sochi agreement have been formed and they have held their meetings. However, as often happens, there is lack of tangible results. The understanding reached on the presidential level does not seem to have trickled down to the enforcement level.

The conditions of the internally displaced persons and their return, which the working groups were tasked to address, remain unchanged. Despite the proclamation of the so-called synchronization, the term introduced by the President of the Russian Federation, the process continues to be one-sided. The railway connection between Sokhumi and Sochi is still running without a hitch, while not a single internally displaced person has "synchronically" returned to his/her rightful place of residence. Furthermore, attempts are under way to reopen marine communication between the two cities without the consent of the Georgian Government.

One of the most significant new developments in the peace process is the introduction of the civilian police component in the Gali district. Undoubtedly, this is a positive trend, which should enhance the security situation of the internally displaced persons, as well as the international personnel present in the region. The related visit by Georgian and Abkhaz law enforcement officers to the Balkans has had a welcome effect on the situation on the whole.

The Security Council is well aware of how thorny the peace process has been in the past 10 years, since the end of hostilities. Uncertainties and disappointments have marred the efforts of many good men and women involved in the process. However, there can be no uncertainty about one fact, the fact that when the Security Council manages to muster up enough courage and constructive spirit, problems get

solved. It is in this spirit that I would like to share with the Council our views on what remains to be done, beyond the positive elements I discussed above, so that real progress can be achieved.

In one document after another, the importance of the progress in political process is strenuously highlighted. The Geneva documents also rightly recognize that no real progress can be achieved without finding a political solution. However, the Abkhaz leadership, with a reckless disregard for the will of the international community, still refuse to accept the "Boden Paper". The one-time effort to transmit the document to the Abkhazs has also lost all momentum. The Security Council, much to our disbelief, finds it insurmountably difficult even to endorse the document, giving it the authority of all members of the Council.

Much to the detriment of the peace process, the unilateral actions of one member of the Security Council still continue, despite our stated protestations. The railway connection is still operating, the en-masse issuance of Russian passports to the residents of the separatist region has never slowed down and the visits of the official representatives and politicians of the Russian Federation to Abkhazia is on the rise, each time leading to the issuance of the promise that Abkhazia will never be abandoned by Russia. Most discouraging are the deliberate efforts by these visitors to discredit any potentially positive role this Security Council member can play in the peace process. Case in point: these visits are taking place in the background of recent recommitment of the Russian Federation at the last summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Yalta (September 2003) to the 1996 decision of the heads of State of the Commonwealth.

I have to report that, unfortunately, nothing has changed in the human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, a fact that is also echoed in the report of the Secretary-General. The Abkhazs continue to refuse the opening of the human rights office in the Gali district that the United Nations has been trying to establish for the past four years. Teaching in the native Georgian language is still prohibited. It doesn't take an international lawyer to qualify such a behaviour as bearing an element of genocide, unless the Security Council can find some other definition.

The so-called customs and border authorities of the Abkhaz separatist regime are functioning without any particular difficulty and, most alarmingly, it is viewed by all as the normal order of business, particularly by the peacekeepers of the Commonwealth of Independent States, who stand side by side with them. The question of the peacekeepers is of the most significant concern. Along with the well-known problems, which we have continuously tried to bring to the attention of the Council, this fall the Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping force managed to outdo itself. Demonstrating utmost disregard for its mandate, or any common sense for that matter, the force conducted illegal searches, detentions and interrogations as well as verbal and physical abuse of the civilian Georgian population in the Zugdidi region. Not only was the Georgian side not told in advance about these actions, but they went on despite our protestations, including at the diplomatic level.

The illegal operation of the Russian military base in Gudauta, Abkhazia, still continues, despite the commitment by the Russian Federation to shut it down. Most surprisingly, the base continues to function even after President Putin declared it closed. I would like to remind the Security Council that the base is operating without the consent of Georgia and in contradiction of international norms. We have

demonstrated our flexibility on the issue and are now ready to continue, if the appropriate Russian authorities will ever return to the negotiating table.

As we continuously try to alert the Security Council to the shortcomings in the peace process, we do hope that requisite political will and necessary leadership will be expressed by the membership to address the problems we have highlighted.

(*Signed*) Revaz **Adamia**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2003/1081

Security Council

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Letter dated 12 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the message sent by H.E. Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, on the occasion of the debate on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for it to be circulated as a document of the Security Council under the agenda item entitled "Situation in Côte d'Ivoire".

(*Signed*) Philippe D. **Djancone-Bi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

03-61216 (E) 131103 131103

Annex to the letter date 12 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Department of United Nations and and Specialized Agencies Affairs

Republic of Côte d'Ivoire
Union — Discipline — Work

Abidjan, 10 November 2003

Message from H.E. Mr. Laurent Gbagbo, President of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire to the Security Council on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of MINUCI

Mr. President,

Members of the Security Council are meeting today to assess the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in accordance with resolution 1479 (2003) of 13 May 2003 establishing the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) and to consider whether to renew its mandate.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank members of the Council for their continued interest in the situation in my country, and to express my gratitude and that of the people and Government of Côte d'Ivoire for the means deployed by the international community as a whole, and by the Secretary-General in particular, to restore peace in Côte d'Ivoire.

I am pleased to inform you that in the interval since resolution 1479 (2003) was adopted significant progress has been made in implementing the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra II Agreements.

Without listing all the important measures the Government has taken to guarantee peace and ensure the security of people and property, I should like to point out that the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme has begun and that the Ministers of Defence, Security and the Family, Children and Women have been appointed, thus completing, following intense negotiations, the Government of National Reconciliation. We should also mention that we have begun redeploying the administration to the western part of the country.

At this stage it would be appropriate to re-examine the very nature of MINUCI so as to provide it with the necessary means in terms of manpower, logistics and a broader mandate so that it can be deployed throughout the territory and be an instrument of the international community, capable of maintaining peace and security throughout the country.

Maintaining the current status of MINUCI has proved to have limitations for the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, for the following reasons:

1. Resolution 1479 (2003) states in paragraph 2 that MINUCI's mandate is to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and including a military component on the basis of option (b) identified in the Secretary-General's report (S/2003/374), complementing the operations of the

French forces and those of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The mission has no direct mandate to intervene in order to maintain the peace; it complements the operations carried out by the French and ECOWAS forces which themselves are limited by their mandate. It is made up of 76 unarmed liaison officers, 42 of whom are in the field, and it makes sure that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General receives accurate information concerning the military and humanitarian situation so he can carry out his mission.

MINUCI has no soldiers, no weapons and its military component acts as liaison between the Forces Licorne, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MICECI) and the Forces Nouvelles.

2. Maintenance of peace and security is the responsibility of the Forces Licorne and the MICECI (ECOFORCE) of ECOWAS.

MICECI has 1,383 soldiers and the French Licorne forces have 4,000 men. Whereas MICECI is desperately short of logistic means and personnel the Forces Licorne have no problems in terms of materiel but find it difficult to spread out without authorization from the Forces Nouvelles. France bears the financial burden of its forces alone.

The ECOWAS forces have insufficient means and the problem of financing that force is acute.

The Ghanaian contingent is financed by the United Kingdom, the Benin contingent by Belgium, the Senegalese, Togolese and Nigerian by France, and others such as the United States, Germany, the European Union provide material and financial support for that West African force; however, it is desperately short of means to spread out throughout the national territory.

The Commander of that force is in a difficult situation, for he has only 1,383 soldiers. Moreover, he is not in a position to plan its activities for his resources come through very slowly. Right now, he has enough for just two weeks of operations.

Maintaining the current status of MINUCI and the means available to MICECI will not be conducive to implementation of the peace agreement, inter alia national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, securing the border and monitoring national mineral and agricultural products which are currently being looted; these tasks must be given to an international force that is financed by the United Nations and that has a mandate to that effect.

The ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire is limited in what it can do by the logistic means available to it and it is dependent to a large extent on the Forces Licorne which lend it heavy equipment. How can it act as a deterrent when it does not have its own means?

For Côte d'Ivoire, the only desirable option is for MINUCI to be turned into a United Nations peacekeeping operation which would include MICECI and for the French forces to preserve their current status.

But in order for this MINUCI to be able to carry out its mission properly it would have to be a much larger force — at least 10,000 troops.

Should this idea meet with the approval of all the members of the Security Council, the United Nations would take over the role that up to now has been that of the Forces Licorne, and MICECI would be part of the new MINUCI, transformed into a peacekeeping operation and alone capable of meeting everyone's expectations.

That, Mr. President, is the position of Côte d'Ivoire concerning the renewal of the mandate of MINUCI. I am sure I can count on your usual understanding and support.

In any event, I believe the time has come to invite members of the Council to reflect with us on the need for an overall approach to issues relating to peace, which could be achieved by means of a subregional stabilization plan that West Africa could set up.

Such an initiative is dear to Côte d'Ivoire and to a number of Governments in our geographical area and it would be in line with preventive diplomacy efforts and should help put an end to the conflict-coup d'état spiral that is preventing the subregion from devoting its resources and energies to the only worthwhile struggle, namely, the struggle for development.

Accordingly, we hope that the international community, and the Security Council in particular will give us their support.

I thank you.

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Letter dated 12 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour, in my capacity as the current Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to transmit herewith a copy of a press statement issued at the end of a one-day mini ECOWAS summit held in Accra on 11 November 2003.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nana **Effah-Apenteng**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

03-61062 (E) 131103

Annex to the letter dated 12 November 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

1. The Heads of State and Government of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria and Togo met in Accra on 11 November 2003 for consultations on the political and security situation in West Africa, and in particular the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

2. They were of the view that close and harmonious relations amongst the States of West Africa would be greatly beneficial to the subregion. They therefore pledged to build good neighbourly relations and to promote peace and stability in the subregion.

3. Regarding the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the President and the Prime Minister undertook to work closely together to ensure that the Government of National Reconciliation is able to function as a team. They also undertook to implement the programme of work drawn up by the Government of National Reconciliation.

4. They agreed on the need to guarantee the security of the members of the Government of National Reconciliation. To this end, 80 additional gendarmes are to be deployed within 7 days to augment the personal security of the Ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation.

5. The Heads of State and Government reminded the political class of their responsibility towards curbing the excesses of the media. They therefore requested the political forces and leaders in control of the media organs to take the necessary steps and prevail on the media to act in conformity with the code of ethics of their profession and, together with civil society, to contribute effectively to the reinforcement of the national reconciliation process and to the return of social cohesion in Côte d'Ivoire.

6. The Heads of State and Government appealed to the United Nations Security Council to consider the possibility of increasing the strength of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire and transform it into a United Nations peacekeeping force.

United Nations S/2003/1083

Security Council

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12 November 2003
English
Original: English and French

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions concerning Côte d'Ivoire, in particular its resolution 1479 (2003) of 13 May 2003 which authorized the establishment of a special political mission in Côte d'Ivoire as confirmed in the letter of the Security Council President to the Secretary-General (A/58/535), and its resolutions 1464 (2003) of 4 February 2003 and 1498 (2003) of 4 August 2003,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 4 November 2003 (S/2003/1069),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Côte d'Ivoire and *reaffirming also* its opposition to any attempts to take power by unconstitutional means,

Reaffirming also its endorsement of the agreement signed by the Ivorian political forces at Linas-Marcoussis on 24 January 2003 (S/2003/99) ("Linas-Marcoussis Agreement"), approved by the Conference of Heads of State on Côte d'Ivoire held in Paris on 25 and 26 January,

Stressing the urgent need for all parties to participate fully in the Government of National Reconciliation so as to enable it to implement fully all the provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement,

Stressing also the importance of the commitment of the Government of National Reconciliation to resume effective administration throughout Côte d'Ivoire and reminding all Ivorian parties of their obligation to contribute positively thereto,

Reaffirming the need for the Government of National Reconciliation to commit itself fully and immediately to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme (DDR), including the dismantling of militias, and to the restructuring of the armed forces,

Recalling the importance of the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference and cooperation in the relations between States of the region,

Further recalling its full support for the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and France to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict,

Noting the continued need for MINUCI in accordance with its resolution 1479 (2003),

03-61194 (E) 131103

Noting with concern the continued existence of challenges to the stability of Côte d'Ivoire and *determining* that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations special political mission in Côte d'Ivoire, MINUCI, shall be extended until 4 February 2004;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council by 10 January 2004 on MINUCI's efforts to facilitate peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire, including how those efforts might be improved and in particular the possible reinforcement of the United Nations presence in Côte d'Ivoire;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.